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DIVORCES IN A TWILIGHT ZONE
*Walter L. Pope
While no opinion poll has been taken of the
lawyers in Montana and hence one cannot speak
with too great certainty in the matter, it is believed
that the opinion of the majority of the Supreme
Court in Crenshaw v. Crenshaw' has thrown the
members of the bar into a state of considerable
confusion.
The decision is noteworthy (1) because it con-
demns as a mere pleading of legal conclusions a
type of complaint for divorce quite commonly as-
sumed to be an adequate statement of ultimate
facts, and (2) because in view of considerable un-
certainty as to whether a judgment based on a com-
plaint which fails to state a cause of action is open
to collateral attack, numerous existing divorce de-
crees founded on similar complaints may now be
open to question.
Had the court contented itself with holding,
as it did, that the rather sketchy complaint was in
sufficient, and that it could not be aided by allega-
tions inserted in the reply under the heading of
*Professor of Low, Montana State University, and practicing attorney in
Missoula, Mont.
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"Cross-complaint to De fendant's Cross-complaint,"
not too much fault could be found with the de-
cision. Or if the court had held that the case was
one in which it might reject the findings of the
trial court because there existed a preponderance
of evidence against such findings, and had pro-
ceeded, as it did, to find the plaintiff's evidence
insufficient to make a case, the members of the
bar would not have been particularly startled, as
there are plenty of instances in the Montana reports
in which tile Supreme Court has undertaken to
upset the findings of the trial judge and even of
the jury, and to make its own findings of fact, not-
withstanding conflicts in the evidence. In this state,
as is probably the case everywhere, the border line
between cases in which the court will and in which
it will not overturn findings of fact in the lower
court is not too well settled.'
What has created the confusion among mem-
bers of the bar is the fact that the majority of the
court, not being content to dispose of the case on
these other grounds, proceeded to analyze the at-
tempted statement of a cause of action for divorce
set out in the "Cross-complaint to Defendant's
Cross-complaint" included in the reply, and held
these allegations insufficient. They read as follows:
2 For statements of the rule, see Fousek v DeForest, (1931) 90 Mont.
448, 4 P. (2d) 472, and Casey v Northern Poc. Ry. Co. (1921) 60
Mont. 56, 198 P. 141. For recent decisions on which the court was
sharply divided see Cullen v Peschel (1943) 115 Mont. 187, 142 P.
(2d) 559. (Johnson, C. J.: "I agree with the majority in their opinion
of the preponderance of the evidence; but since this court has not been
given the authority to overrule the jury in that respect, I am compelled
to concur with the above dissenting opinion."); Miller v. Miller (1948)
........ Mont .......... 190 P. (2d) 72. (The court examined a partially
disintegrated deed which the trial court found had originally been
signed, and found that the trial judge was wrong. It was claimed that
chemical action of ground moisture during nine years while the deed
was buried had obliterated the ink used in the signature. Neither court
suggested the desirability of procuring expert testimony on the ques-
tioned document.)
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"That since said marriage, the defendant has
been guilty of extreme cruelty, in that said
defendant has inflicted grevious and bodily
injury, and mental suffering upon the plain-
tiff by pursuing such a course of conduct to-
ward her and such treatment of her, existing
in and persisted in for more than one year
immediately preceding the commencement of
this action, which justly and reasonably is of
such a nature and character as to destroy the
peace of mind and happiness of the plaintiff
and to entirely defeat the proper and legitimate
objects of marriage, and to render the continu-
ance of the married relation between the plain-
tiff and the defendant perpetually unreason-
able and intolerable. That in part, such con-
duct and treatment are as follows:
"That since said marriage and particularly dur-
ing the past five years, defendant has been
rough, tough, overbearing, cruel, brutal, and'
neglectful in his treatment of the plaintiff;
that he has nagged her and found fault with
her in many things she has done; that defend-
ant cannot write intelligibly and during their
married life, plaintiff has had to be the book-
keeper, auditor and letter writer for the de-
fendant in his various transactions. During
all said time, plaintiff has tried to reason with
defendant, but when she has done so, defend-
ant has raged and become violent. That de-
fendant is cunning and in public can act like
a gentleman, but in private, defendant, in his
treatment toward plaintiff, has acted like a
'hell cat.' That all through the transactions
concerning the acquiring of the Crenshaw
Apartment House property and during the pe-
riod of time from 1937 to this date, plaintiff
has assisted defendant assidously in the pur-
chase, improvement and remodeling of said
property and in the financing and managing
of the same; much of which time defendant
3
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has been away and left to plaintiff the sole
responsibility of said property. That despite
the careful considerations which plaintiff has
given said property, defendant has found fault
with her and has never treated her with re-
spect and consideration which a husband
should treat a wife....
"That defendant by his mean and uncouth at-
titude as aforesaid, has annoyed and irritated
plaintiff and has caused her to worry and be-
come nervous, to lose sleep and to become
impaired in health.
"That plaintiff has remonstrated with defend-
ant and has endeavored to have him treat her
as a husband should treat a wife, but he has
failed and refused to do so. That plaintiff can
no tonger live with defendant as his wife, and
that by reason of the treatment of the plain-
tiff by the defendant, there is no love or af-
fection between plaintiff and the defendant
and the continuance of the marriage relation
between the defendant and the plaintiff is in-
tolerable to the plaintiff. ' 3
The language was held to constitute a recital
of a series of mere legal conclusions. It was held
that the pleading did not contain a statement of
essential facts; that it was not sufficient to charge
the grounds for divorce in the language set out in
the statute, but that the pleader "must charge the
time, place and circumstances and from these facts
it must be determined if the conduct is cruel ...
as defined by the statute."4
It appears that no attack was made upon this
pleading in the district court, by demurrer or other-
wise, and apparently evidence was received in sup-
3182 P. (2d) at p. 486.4 1d., p. 487.
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port of it without objection. The objection that it
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action was first raised on appeal.
As to whether the majority of the court were
correct in condemning the language used in the
pleading as insufficient to state a cause of action,
no critical comment is necessary, as the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Angstinan forcefully criti-
sizes the decision. Mr. Justice Angstman not only
points out that the condemned language sufficiently
charges infliction of grevious bodily injury, but
that in the absence of attack upon the pleading in
the lower court and in view of the failure of the
defendant to denmand a more definite statement or
a bill of particulars, the allegations should have
been held sufficient when attacked for the first
time on appeal. He calls attention to "respectable
authority" holding that it is sufficient under these
circumstances to charge cruelty in the language of
the statute "without pleading the evidence consti-
tuting the cruelty." 5 He said:
"If defendant desired a more definite state-
ment of time and place of the cruelty relied
upon he should have raised the point in ap-
propriate manner. If he was unable to meet
the charges because they were too indefinite
as to time, place and circumstances, he is the
one to raise that objection. Neither this court
nor the lower court is obligated to raise the
point of its own notion.
"The only reasonable inference that can be
drawn is that defendant well knew the time,
place and circumstances of the cruelty relied
upon by plaintiff and did not desire a more
51d., p. 492.
5
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definite statement thereof. He does not now
contend that they were too general to enable
him to prepare his defense. "6
The dissenting opinion also said on another
point involved in the case that while the trial court
might have disregarded the cross-complaint or
stricken it from the files had it been attacked in
the lower court, yet "in legal effect the parties and
the court considered the cross-complaint set out
in the reply as an amendment to the complaint...
The parties without objection tried the case on that
theory and do not now raise any question regard-
ing the propriety of the plaintiff's cross-com-
plaint."7 With respect to the sufficiency of the
evidence the dissent argued (citing Poague v.
Poague)8 that there was substantial evidence sup-
porting the court's findings and that "upon this
state of facts we are not permitted to disturb the
judgment, being governed by the oft-repeated rule
that this court will not overturn the findings of the
trial court unless there is a decided preponderance
of evidence against them."
In striking down this pleading as void, as con-
taining nothing but legal conclusions, the majority
of the court appears to have gone far beyond any-
thing it has heretofore done in dealing with other
types of cases.- See, for example, the court's dis-
cussion in the case of Linney v. Chicago, etc., R. R.
Co. 10 There, in pointing out what would constitute
a sufficient allegation of ultimate fact in a negli-
gence case, the court said:
6 1d., p. 493.
71d., p. 491.
8(1930) 87 Mont. 433, 288 P. 454.
9182 P. (2d) at p. 495.
1Old., p. 236.
6
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"To illustrate: If the plaintiff in this case had
alleged that the defendant company in the op-
eration of the cars did so without giving any
warning of their approach to the driver of
plaintiff's automobile, the complaint would
have contained an allegation of negligence in
general terms which would render the com-
plaint sufficient as against a general demurrer.
The failure to give warning may have consisted
of the failure to ring a bell, blow a whistle or
display a light. The general term would be
the failure to give warning; the specific act
would be any one of the suggested omissions."11
The court now holds that in a divorce com-
plaint based on mental cruelty "you must charge
the time, place and circumstances and from these
facts it must be determined if the conduct is cruel
... as defined by the statute."12
In such a divorce case the appellate court is
poorly equipped to determine whether the course
of conduct "justly and reasonably is of such a na-
ture and character as to destroy the peace of mind
and happiness of the plaintiff." or "to defeat the
proper and legitimate objects of marriage and to
render the continuance of the married relation per-
petually unreasonable and intolerable."13 In mak-
ing this a ground for divorce the legislature must
have intended that the trial court should take into
consideration psychological factors which would
vary with the individuals involved. Clearly mere
words spoken by one spouse to the other may suf-
fice to constitute cruelty of this character. Presum-
ably absence of any words should suffice, as in the
111d., p. 236.
12182 P. (2d) at p. 487.
13R.C.M. 1935, 65738.
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case where one spouse refused to speak to the other.
The legislature clearly recognized its inability to
specify just what words would constitute mental
cruelty. It did not purport to define with particu-
larity the type of conduct which would come within
the statute. The court has held that continuous
nagging may be ground for divorce.14 In the Cren-
shaw case plaintiff charged "that he has nagged
her and found fault with her in many things she
has done."15 Unless we are to assume that the court
now holds that nagging is no longer a ground for
a divorce, we must assume that in the Crenshaw
case the court has held that the plaintiff must allege
the days on which nagging occurred, what words
were used in the alleged nagging (with perhaps
what preceded the use of the words), and the place
where the words were used, and that if an appeal
be taken, the language pleaded must be sufficient
to convince the court that it constituted nagging
and not merely "little flare-ups" or "mere austerity
of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of lan-
guage, or even occasional sallies of passion" which
"do not threaten bodily harm or impairment of
health." 6 It requires no expert in domestic affairs
to know that one party to a marriage may suffer
excruciatingly and intolerably from words which
when used toward another person might simply
"go in one ear and out the other." It is the trial
judge who alone can deal with such problems and
he should be in a position to deal with them on the
basis of a complaint of the type and kind here dis-
cussed.
14putnam v. Putnam (1929) 86 Mont. 135, 282 P. 855.
15182 P. (2d) at p. 486.
161d., p. 489.
8
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The majority cast aside the argument that the
defendant was apparently satisfied with the com-
plaint since he demanded no greater specification,
by saying that in a divorce suit public policy must
be taken into consideration, since the state makes
itself a party to every marriage, and hence the suit
is not a mere controversy between private parties.
But surely the state's interest in these matters
does not go to mere procedural matters, or to the
form of a complaint. The primary purpose of the
complaint is to inform the defendant of the charges
against him. If he is satisfied, as he was here, there
should be no rule of public policy which requires
the court to propound a rule of pleading merely
for the rule's sake.
From now on the careful lawyer will have to
insert in a divorce complaint charging mental cru-
elty all of his evidence, for the decision wipes out
the distinction between the pleading of evidence
and the pleading of ultimate facts. And since the
complaint "must charge the time, place and cir-
cumstances," 17 the well-advised client will keep a
careful day-by-day memorandum of the acts of cru-
elty, so that the attorney may be furnished the re-
quired particulars.
In a day when the tendency is toward more
simplified pleadings, and the requirement of less
elaboration in the complaint (defending opponent
being protected by discovery procedures and his
right to demand a bill of particulars),18 it seems
171d., p. 487.
18 For on illustration of the modem treatment .of pleading, see Form 9,
"Complaint for Negligence," Appendix on Forms, FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
9
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odd that in Montana a complaint to quiet title may
be stated in a single short sentence,19 and a com-
plaint for negligence at a railroad crossing may
simply charge failure to give warning of the ap-
proach of a train,20 but a complaint for divorce on
the ground of extreme cruelty must, in effect, plead
all the evidence.'
The majority of the court seemingly regarded
the defect in the pleading as so serious as to deprive
the court of jurisdiction to grant a divorce, for the
court quoted from text authority as follows:
"Besides the court has no jurisdiction of any
matter not contained in the pleadings; and if
the Chancellor should assume to make an ad-
judication not justified by the pleadings, his
decree would be coram non judice, and void
on the face of the proceedings; and this would
be so, even though the facts proved would have
abundantly supported the decree had there
been pleadings justifying the proof."2 2
a
9 Slette v. Review Publishing Co. (1924) 71 Mont. 518, 230 P. 580.
20Supra, note 10.
2 1For a useful statement of the test for determining the distinction be-
tween ultimate facts and evidential or probative facts see Nichols v.
Nichols (1896) 134 Mo. 187, 35 S.W. 577. Defendants, charged with
having "wrongfully enticed, influenced and induced plaintiff's husband
to abandon her," argued that this was but a statement of a conclusion
of law, and that the acts done and words spoken should have been
stated. The court said: "The ultimate fact which is constitutive of the
cause of action in this case is that of wrongfully inducing the husband
of plaintiff to abandon her. The methods adopted to accomplish that
purpose are mere matters of evidence, from which the ultimate fact is
proved, or may be inferred. Various methods may have been adopted
to accomplish the purpose, and a denial of them, if stated, would not
form a single issue involving the whole remedial right. They would be
probative, and not constitutive, facts. In the opinion of the jury, an
inference that defendants wrongfully induced plaintiff's husband to
leave her might not be drawn from one or more acts proved, but might
readily be drawn from them all, taken in the aggregate. No issue could
therefore be made upon each act and statement of defendants that would
conclude the right of plaintiff to recover. Wrongfully inducing plain-
tiff's husband to abandon her is conclusion of fact, depending upon
the proof of acts, declarations, and conduct of defendants. It is not a
conclusion of law, but a fact from which a legal conclusion is to. be
drawn."
22182 P. (2d) at p. 484.
10
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It is this reference to want of jurisdiction
which apparently has the members of the bar guess-
ing. It brings to mind the language of the court in
Crawford v. Pierse 3 In that case the court said:
"Jurisdiction is the power to hear and deter-
mine the particular case presented for consid-
eration, and to render such a judgment as the
law authorizes in that case. In other words,
it is the power to hear and determine the ques-
tions coram judice in that particular case."2
and:
"It is elementary that when the judgment-roll
upon its face shows that the court was without
jurisdiction to render the particular judgment
its pronouncement is in fact no judgment. It
cannot be enforced. No right can be derived
from it. All proceedings founded upon it are
invalid and ineffective for any purpose. It is
open to collateral attack. The court which ren-
dered it may set aside at any time as an en-
cumbrance upon its records... An affirmance
of such a judgment on appeal cannot make it
valid . . .Nor can the legislature by curative
statute give it life or force."25
and also:
"The court cannot redress a particular wrong
unless the facts constituting the wrong are
made manifest to it in a written complaint,
as provided by the statute. It is only by this
means that its general power can be brought
into activity in a given case. If the pleading
is not sufficient to put the defendant in the
wrong, the court cannot grant redress. A judg-
ment based upon such a pleading is invalid.
23(1919) 56 Mont. 371, 185 P. 315.2 4 1d., p. 376.2 51d., p. 375.
11
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The pleading is in effect no more than a piece
of blank paper. And, since when a judgment
has been rendered on default, the complaint,
with the memorandum indorsed upon it that
default has been entered, the summons with
the proof of service, and a copy of the judg-
ment constitute the record, (Rev. Codes, sec.
6719) the record itself discloses the infirmity
of the judgment. It is thus exposed to collateral
attack at any time when it is sought to be made
the basis of a right."26
Many members of the bar had come to assume
that the court would no longer follow Crawford v.
Pierse" It is not generally the law."
But in the recent case of Lindsey v. Drs. Kee-
nan, Andrews & Allred,29 the court again quoted
with approval this language of Crawford v. Pierse. 0
Perhaps the court still thinks that it is good law.
If then the language of the pleading in Cren-
shaw v. Crenshaw is wholly insufficient because
"there is no specific charge giving the defendant
notice of what he is called upon to answer,' '31 and if
in consequence, " the court has no jurisdiction of
any matter not contained in the pleadings, '3 2 and
in consequence the "decree would be coram non
judice, and void on the face of the pleadings, ' ' 3
261d., p. 377.
2 7 Especially since the decision in State ej tel. Delmoe v. District Court
(1935) 100 Mont. 131, 46 P. (2d) 39. See, howeevr, Hanrahan v.
Anderson (1939) 108 Mont. 218, at p. 237; 90 P. (2d) 494.
2 8 See for example, in respect to actions for divorce, Kelsey v. Miller (1 928)
203 Col. 61, 263 P. 200 at p. 211; In re McNeil (1909) 155 Col. 333,
100 P. 1086 at p. 1089; C.J.S. p. 826, Note 50; C.J. p. 175, note 56.
29(1946) ........ Mont .......... 165 P. (2d) 804, 163 A.L.R. 487.
301n the Lindsey case the complaint disclosed affirmatively that there was
not the necessary want of probable cause.
31182 P. (2d) at p. 487..
32 1d., p. 484.
33 1d., p. 484.
12
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and if, under such circumstances "it is thus exposed
to collateral attack at any time when it is sought
to be made the basis of a right, 34 what is the status
of the hundreds of divorce decrees which have been
entered upon substantially identical complaints,
and of the parties to those decrees who have since
remarried and in some cases had children by the
new marriages?
To satisfy his curiosity the writer asked the
clerk of one district court to pull from the files the
judgment-rolls in some fifty divorce cases which
had been disposed of prior to the decision in the
Crenshaw case. Approximately three-fourths of the
samples taken disclosed complaints charging ex-
treme cruelty based on the statute relied upon in
the Crenshaw case-that is to say, mental suffer-
ing resulting from a course of conduct as defined
in the statute, section 5738.35 In a majority of those
cases it would be extremely difficult to distinguish
the language used from that contained in the Cren-
shaw case. In each case the pleader first alleges a
course of conduct in the language of the statute
and then proceeds to particularize. The following
are taken from three rather typical complaints and
the language here quoted in each case followed the
general allegations in the language of the statute.
Complaint No. 1:
"That during said period of time, and as a part
of said course of conduct, the defendant has
acted in an unpleasant and disagreeable man-
ner toward the plaintiff, and has persistently
ignored and disregarded the happiness, welfare
and peace of mind of the plaintiff; that de-
3 4Supra, note 22.
35R.C.M. 1935.
13
Pope: Crenshaw?Divorces in a Twilight Zone
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1948
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
fendant did upon many and various occasions
quarrel bitterly with plaintiff and without any
sufficient reason therefor; that defendant has
been continually nagging and otherwise fault-
finding with plaintiff; that defendant's con-
duct has been and now is arbitrary and tyran-
nical, which has given rise to quarrels in the
home, thus disturbing and upsetting plaintiff's
state of mind, happiness and well-being; that
defendant has acted coldly toward plaintiff,
has displayed no affection for him, and has
plainly indicated by her conduct, actions and
statements that she no longer cares for plain-
tiff, and that there is in fact no longer any love
and affection between them."
Complaint No. 2:
".*. plaintiff alleges that the defendant has
constantly since the time of their marriage
berated him and abused him and called him
vile and loathsome names and has constantly
since the time of their marriage quarreled with
him and nagged at him over trivial matters
and plaintiff alleges that the'defendant no
longer cares for him or loves him and has told
him to get a divorce and has told him that she
would no longer live with him. Plaintiff al-
leges that the conduct of the defendant toward
him has made it impossible for them to live
together as husband and wife, and her conduct
toward him has destroyed the marriage rela-
tionship between them."
Complaint No. 3:
"... and that such actions and conduct on the
part of the defendant consist in part of the
following:
That the defendant constantly nags and scolds
plaintiff and continually finds fault with what
the plaintiff does or says;
14
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That the defendant has a violent temper and
without provocation flies into fits of rage and
uses profanity in the presence of plaintiff and
their children, and has called plaintiff vile and
vicious names;
That defendant is not companionable and re-
fuses to associate with plaintiff's friends and
acquaintances, even to the extent of visiting
the plaintiff's own parents;
That by reason of said actions on the part of
the defendant, plaintiff was forced to leave
their home on May 2, 1947, and has continued
to live separate and apart from the defendant
since that time."
It would be a matter of considerable interest
to make a thorough and extended analysis of a sub-
stantial number of complaints upon which divorce
decrees have been based in all districts throughout
the state. It is believed that such an analysis would
disclose hundreds and perhaps thousands of com-
plaints similar to those just quoted. Most members
of the bar would have great difficulty in finding
them any more efficacious than that found insuf-
ficient in the Crenshaw case.
In most of the cases examined, the divorce
was entered upon defendant's default. Defendant
was not present or represented at the time of the
trial and if evidence of matters outside of the com-
plaint was received, the complaint could not be
"deemed amended" under the rule of Blackwelder
v. Fergus Motor Co..36
If these decrees are open to collateral attack,
what happens if one of the parties dies possessed
of a substantial estate and his former wife chooses
36(1927) 80 Mont. 374, 260 P. 734.
15
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to claim an interest in his estate? If he remarries,
may his new wife have the marriage annulled?
What are the rights of the children of a subsequent
marriage? The books are full of startling examples
of what happens when a successful collateral attack.
is made upon a divorce decree.37
The decision may yet lead to one good result.
Sooner or later a divorce decree founded on a com-
plaint like that in the Crenshaw case will be attacked
collaterally. The court will then have to decide
whether to invite raids by ex-wives upon their for-
mer husbands' estates or to allow a later marriage
to be annulled for invalidity of an earlier divorce.3
Then, perhaps, the court may, at long last, repudiate
the doctrine of Crawford v. Pierse, and frankly
adopt the rule of In re McNeil. 9
3 TWilliams v. North Carolina (1945) 65 S. C. 1092, 89 L.E. 1577, 325
U. S. 226 (Conviction of bigamous cohabitation); German Savings
Society v. Dormitzer (1904) 24 S. C. 221, 48 L.E. 373, 192 U. S. 125(property claimed by heirs of divorced wife); Smith v. Foto (1938)
285 Mich. 361, 280 N.W. 790, 120 A.L.R. 801 (husband permitted
to attack property settlement in Florida divorce suit on ground wife's
previous Michigan divorce void); Sammons v. Pike (1909) 108 Minn.
291, 120 N.W. 540, 23 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1254 (Ejectment for wife's share
in husband's real property); In re Christensen's Estate (1898) 17 Utah
412, 53 P. 1003, 41 L.R.A. 504 (Divorced wife granted share in
estate of husband who had remarried and had children by the later
marriage.)
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